Papers

 

David Chalmers

• Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
• Consciousness and its Place in Nature
• How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?
• What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?
• The Representational Character of Experience
• Perception and the Fall from Eden
• What is the Unity of Consciousness? (with Tim Bayne)
• The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief
• On Sense and Intension
• The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics
• The Components of Content
• The Nature of Epistemic Space
• Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?
• Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation (with Frank Jackson)
• The Extended Mind (with Andy Clark)
• A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition
• The Matrix as Metaphysics
• Two Dimensional Semantics
• Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap
• The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism
• Scott Soames' Two-Dimensionalism
• Probability and Propositions
• Ramsey + Moore = God (with Alan Hajek)
• Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account
• Ontological Anti-Realism

Links to all David Chalmers' published, and some unpublished, papers can be found here.

 

Tim Bayne

• The Feeling of Doing: Deconstructing the Phenomenology of Agency
• Divided Brains & Unified Phenomenology: An essay on Michael Tye's "Consciousness and Persons"
• In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions

Links to more of Tim Bayne's papers can be found here.

 

Berit Brogaard

• The Missing Dimension: Two-Dimensional Approaches to Matters Epistemic
• That may be Jupiter: A Heuristic for Thinking Two-Dimensionally
• The But Not All: A Partitive Account of Plural Definite Descriptions
• Two Modal -Isms: Fictionalism and Ersatzism
• Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?
• What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh
• Sea Battle Semantics
• Number Words and Ontological Commitment

More of Berit Brogaard's papers can be found here.

 

Martin Davies

• Consciousness and the Varieties of Aboutness
• Externalism and Experience
• Reference, Contingency, and the Two-Dimensional Framework
• Inference and Explanation in Cognitive Neuropsychology
• An Approach to Philosophy of Cognitive Science
• Cognitive Neuropsychology and the Philosophy of Mind
• Anosognosia and the Two-Factor Theory of Delusions
• Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account
• Pathologies of Belief
• The Mental Simulation Debate: A Progress Report
• Mental Simulation, Tacit Theory, and the Threat of Collapse
• Persons and their Underpinnings
• Interaction without Reduction: The Relationship between Personal and Sub-personal Levels of Description [pdf]

More of Martin Davies' online papers can be found here.

 

Andy Egan

• Billboards, Bombs and Shotgun Weddings
• Secondary Qualities and Self-Location
• Appearance Properties?
• A Puzzle about Perception (with James John)

 

Jordi Fernandez

• Memory and Perception: Remembering Snowflake
• The Intentionality of Memory
• Self-knowledge, rationality and Moore's paradox
• Resisting Ruthless Reductionism: A Commentary on Bickle (with Tim Bayne)
• Privileged Access Revisited
• Externalism and Self-Knowledge: A Puzzle in Two Dimensions
• Privileged Access Naturalized

 

Frank Jackson

• Mind and Illusion
• The Case for A Priori Physicalism
• From H2O to Water: The Relevance to A Priori Passage
• Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation (with David Chalmers)
• Representation and Experience
• Narrow Content and Representation
• Why We Need A-Intensions
• Locke-ing onto Content
• All That Can Be at Issue in the Theory-Theory/Simulation Debate
• Cognitivism, A Priori Deduction, and Moore
• Ethical Particularism and Patterns (with Philip Pettit and Michael Smith)
• Review of Blackburn's Ruling Passions
• Review of Davidson's Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective
• Review of Franklin's Corrupting the Youth
• Review of Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits
• David Kellogg Lewis: Philosopher and Philosopher of Mind
• Review of Soames' Reference and Description

 

Brendan Jackson

• Beyond Logical Form
• Logical Form: Classical Conception and Recent Challenges
• Truth vs. Pretense in Discourse About Motion (Or Why the Sun Really Does Rise)
• Semantic Natural Kinds

 

Stephan Leuenberger

• Ceteris Absentibus Physicalism
• A New Problem of Descriptive Power
• Humility and Constraints on O-Language
• What is Global Supervenience?
• Metaphysical Probability
• Two Concepts of Intrinsicality
• The Tenability of Desire-as-Belief
• Supervenience in Metaphysics

 

Fiona Macpherson

• Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience
• Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism
• Novel Colours and the Content of Experience
• The Power of Natural Selection
• Perfect Pitch and the Implicit/Explicit Distinction
• Nonconceptual Content and the Nature of Perceptual Experience (with José Luis Bermúdez)

 

John O'Dea

• Transparency and the Unity of Experience [pdf option]
• The Value in Equal Opportunity [pdf option]
• Representationalism, Supervenience, and the Cross-modal Problem [pdf option]
• The Senses and the Structure of Experience [pdf option]
• A Higher-Order, Dispositional Theory of Qualia [pdf option]
• Representationalism, Supervenience, and the Cross-Modal Problem [pdf option]
• An Indexical Account of Sensory Terms 

 

Adam Pautz

• The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem
• Sensory Awareness Is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Emperical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism
• Tracking Intentionalism and Optimal Conditions: A Reply to Byrne and Tye
• Can the Intentionalist be a Reductionist?
• An Argument Against Fregean Reference-Shift Semantics

 

Susanna Schellenberg

• The Situation-Dependency of Perception
• Action and Self-Location in Perception
• Sellarsian Perspectives on Perception and Non-Conceptual Content

 

Nicholas Silins

• Transmission Failure Failure
• Deception and Evidence
• Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic

 

Declan Smithies

• Rationality and the Subject's Point of View

 

Daniel Stoljar

• Two Conceivability Arguments Compared
• Galen Strawson's Real Monism
• Distinctions in Distinction
• The Argument from Revelation
• Introduction to Ignorance and Imagination
• Actors and Zombies
• Physicalism plus Intentionalism Equals Error Theory
• Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts
• The Argument from Diaphanousness
• Consequences of Intentionalism
• Introduction to There's Something About Mary (with Yujin Nagasawa)
• A Neuron Doctrine in the Philosophy of Neuroscience (with Ian Gold)
• Physicalism
• Nominalism and Intentionality
• Two Conceptions of the Physical
• The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical
• 22 November, 2007[Word]